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Abstract.  This article is a book review of The Democratic Experience and Political Violence.  The book 
was co-edited by David Rapoport, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, 
Los Angeles and Leonard Weinberg, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Nevada, Reno. 
 
Today's global mantra?  Conveyed by global mass media it is "democracy and free markets."  Through 
democracy and free markets lies human salvation--or so we are told.  Certainly there is room to question 
both aspects of the mantra as well as the necessity of their linkage.  For example, free markets have 
never been free.  Even if markets were completely free of formal and informal, de facto, counterfactual, 
and a-factual barriers, economic disparities between and among partners in trade and commerce would 
subvert freedom through generating relationships of exploitation and subjugation--an economic 
psychosexuality of sadomasochism. 
 
As another example, as free as markets might become, their very existence and nurturance might not 
best be contingent on democracy or on any specific political model.  Or perhaps, as far as free markets 
might be a boon instead of a bane to human welfare, they might prop up variants of totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, democracy, and various combinations and mutations--some well-articulated, others 
still to be conceived.  Or perhaps, the reason free markets have never or will never be free is contingent 
on politics--i.e., any politics as articulated through political theorists including the variants of democracy. 
 
It is democracy that is the focus of Rapport and Weinberg.  At Issue is the aspect of the global mantra 
that reifies democracy as both prophylaxis and cure to human violence within nation-states.  To the 
discerning reader, however, the Issue soon becomes how to account for the development of the global 
mantra given the extremely ample historical data that should have been both prophylaxis against and 
cure for the mantra. 
 
The elaboration of historical data found in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence originates 
from a 1997 conference wherein participants and then others noted what might charitably be termed an 
ignoring or discounting and less charitably an active reluctance and aversion to considering democracy 
as begetter of violence. What follows are preceis of the chapters--each supported by theory and/or data 
in examining the democracy-violence connection. 
 
Rapoport and Weinberg explore democratic elections, conceive elections as a mode of political 
succession, contrast electoral with hereditary modes of succession, and note the aspects of each that 
seem to require contestation and stimulate the option of violence.  The reader might well note that this 
chapter sets the stage of employing a welcome "seeing is believing" standard for the consequences of 
democracy. 
 
Finn, Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, explores the inevitability that particular groups--
that may be extrapolated to social, economic, ethnic, ideological, and any other performative entity that 
may be stigmatized--are excluded from the electoral, political process in a democracy.  Of special 
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contemporary interest is the exclusion of professed or suspected anti-democratic groups that may 
employ violence whether or not they are excluded or included and even if they are chosen by "the 
people" as electoral winners.  Of great interest and value is Finn's appendix on selected constitutional 
and statutory provisions for electoral exclusion, pp. 70-74.) 
 
Guelke, Professor of Comparative Politics, Queen's University, Belfast, describes and compares three 
1996 democratic elections--viz., the Israeli general elections, the Northern Ireland forum elections, and 
the Western Cape (South Africa) local elections.  Violence permeated them all--be it political violence, its 
threat, or fear of it.  Moreover, violence seems to affect not just the actual vote but also campaign 
behavior, attitudes of the electorate, interpretations of the vote, and the essential public discourse of 
democracy. 
 
Philpott, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, analyzes the 
political construct of self-determination that has been and continues to be publicly embraced by so 
many socially constructed groups--albeit in a manner that leaves universal human rights behind and 
approaches a malignant or pathological narcissism, if not an outright psychopathy or sociopathy.  
Although self-determination is almost always linked with the construct of democracy, it is frequently 
associated with political leaders who have something very different in mind and is differentially 
construed by leaders of representative democracies.  Self-determination, unfortunately, has a long track 
record of legitimizing violence during its quest and afterwards. 
 
Crenshaw, John E. Andrus Professor of Government, Wesleyan University, describes the military 
intervention of India as guarantor of a peace settlement in Sri Lanka's still ongoing ethnic civil war.  
Although not technically an example of violence within a democracy, the intervention can be seen as 
violence within a national grouping of Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils.  Moreover, contending interest 
groups within democratic India, international ethnic groupings professing democratic leanings, and 
democratic Sri Lanka--as well as the larger strategic and even moral interests of democratic entities--
have too often influenced decision-making that instigates and exacerbates violence. 
 
Israeli, Professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern and Chinese History, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 
describes the responses of Western democracies to what he and political authorities of these 
democracies term "fundamentalist Islamic violence" both within and external to these entities.  The 
reader of this chapter may wonder whether Western democracies are capable of resolving political 
violence while retaining democratic essentials and are incapable of coherently construing democratic 
essentials of political violence.  The reader also can profitably integrate this chapter with that of Finn's 
on political exclusion. 
 
Simons, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, presents a seemingly 
optimistic analysis of the absence of "widespread identity-based communal violence" in the United 
States.  However, the reader might note that many other aspects of violence are well-represented 
within the United States democracy including what can be termed the insidious and omnipresent 
disciplinary and punitive features of organizational life that may render one bereft of one's soul even as 
the body remains intact.  Also, some readers might wonder whether there is a tradeoff in democracy 
between communal and other variants of political violence. 
 
Barkun, Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University, analyzes the "radical right" in the United 
States as it justifies violence in the name of democracy within a nation-state that also justifies violence 
in the name of a democracy that--some readers might posit00is de facto controlled by "the right."  
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Ultimately, the psychological dynamics characterizing both levels of violence and violence justification 
may appear to be equivalent. 
 
Sprinzak, Founding Dean, Lauder School of Government, Policy and Diplomacy, Interdisciplinary Center 
in Herzliya, describes extremism--especially militant messianism--and violence in Israel.  He traces the 
longitudinally concurrent development of Israeli democracy and of Jewish political violence within and 
proximal to Israel.  An intriguing conclusion is that violence is not an aberration of democracy or an 
indicator of democracy's weakness but a reinforcer of the democratic essence. 
 
Korbonski, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, traces tensions 
towards violence and towards political violence in Eastern Europe from the post-World War era through 
the disestablishment of the Soviet Union and beyond. A close reading of this chapter seems to suggest 
that increasing ethnic homogeneity within democracies or within entities attempting to become 
democratic may facilitate democracy and minimize violence.  Can this too easily be taken as a 
prescription or rationale for ethnic cleansing in the service of democracy?  In addition, what is posited as 
trauma generated by World War II and the post-War Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe may have 
significantly modified collective attitudes, perhaps even national characters, that, in turn, facilitated 
non-violent political change towards democracy.  Here democracy may seem founded on an intensely 
violent foundation and to require transfusions of violence. 
 
Le Vine, Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St Louis, presents a counterfactual 
analysis of the proposition that democracy may require increments of violence to preserve itself.  This 
proposition is attributed by Le Vine to former United States President Thomas Jefferson and may 
already be shared by readers who have read the previous chapters in this book.  Le Vine strongly 
marshals theory and data against the proposition and the reader can benefit from studying his annex 
depicting so-called free democracies' crises of legitimacy and violent challenges (pp. 287-292). 
 
Eubank, Associate Professor, University of Nevada, and Weinberg engage in counterfactual analysis of 
the contentions that "civic communities" must be well-established to support a viable democracy; that 
these "communities" require long incubation periods; and that democracy is, therefore, likely to fail 
when violence and authoritarianism have been previously well-established.  In the context of Italy, these 
authors contend that regions with the strongest essentials of democracy also have had the most salient 
histories of Fascism and Fascist violence.  The reader might wonder what this bodes for the staying 
power of democracy, its sequelae, and its own actualized and potential violence.  Also, the advancing of 
practical as well as statistical significance to make one's case would be welcome (cf. Table 1, p. 301). 
 
Gans, Professor of French, University of California, Los Angeles, may well cut right to the chase and 
provide a psychological vehicle for political violence regardless of political system.  He cites Pericles' 
funeral oration as recounted in Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War to posit that as perceptions of 
democracy as fairer than other political systems increase, perceivers who fail according to their own 
criteria within a democracy will even more seethe with resentment and justify violence.  Thus, the 
reader may conclude, democracy must contend with the two violent threats of those who view it as 
unfair whether they win or lose and those who view it as fair but still lose.  Isn't this just about 
everyone? 
 
Hewitt, Professor of Sociology, University of Maryland Baltimore Country, describes four examples of 
terrorism within the United States--examples that, presumably, don't qualify as "widespread identity-
based communal violence" according to Simons in an earlier chapter.  These examples include (1) White 
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racist violence in the South during the modern Civil Rights era, (2) the violence of African-American, self-
professed revolutionary groups, (3) predominantly White leftist, self-professed revolutionary violence, 
and (4) predominantly White anti-abortion violence.  The reader may note the analysis' lack of attention 
towards democracy as an elicitor--ineluctable or otherwise--as opposed to merely a context for such 
violence.  It is the reviewer's perspective that Hewitt is committing the fundamental attribution error 
especially regarding political violence attributed to the African-American (at the time, black) groups (cf. 
Tables 2, p. 334, and Table 5, p. 341). 
 
Miller, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, and Schaen, doctoral student in political 
science, University of Cincinnati, rightly critique the deprivation-frustration-aggression hypothesis that 
has for so often and so long been employed to explain urban riots among African-Americans in the 
1960s.  This hypothesis frequently cannot adequately explain or account for empirical data on violence 
obtained by behavioral and political scientists and can too facilely blame the perpetrators as opposed to 
factors of a more systemic and macromolecular nature.  However, Miller and Schaen seem to attribute 
responsibility for political violence more to the law enforcement representatives of democracy, thereby 
obfuscating malignant structural aspects of democracy. 
 
Rapoport and Weinberg conclude that "Outbreaks of violent conflict occur even in the most stable and 
successful of the democracies...." and that "Problems existing outside the democratic context also exist 
within it...."  Their co-authors amply support these conclusions that are very frequently absent from 
public discourse on international affairs and matters of globalization.  For this reason alone, The 
Democratic Experience and Political Violence demands to be read. 
 
Additionally, the reader might be left pondering the tension between two other conclusions of Rapoport 
and Weinberg.  One is that "communism, fascism, national socialism and lesser ideological blueprints for 
human betterment largely have passed from the scene no longer capable of exciting genuine 
enthusiasm...these ideologies were secular religions" and many people have, therefore, lost "a faith that 
has dominated one's life for years..." (pp. 362-364).  The other is that "coming to a realistic 
understanding of democracy's limitations may be something else" (p. 364)--that is, more difficult to 
accomplish than jettisoning the above secular religions. 
 
The tension lies in the following. Can one realistically apperceive democracy and still maintain it as a 
secular religion? Should democracy be or remain a secular religion?  Is there yet another religion--
secular or otherwise--that fits the bill for a world without or with minimal violence.  Or is it the very 
psychology of religion in all its structural, process, and functional aspects that is part of the genesis of 
violence?  Or yet again is the evolutionary psychology of homo sapiens such that the very discourse 
about political process and violence can do no more than beget false consciousness? 
 
So as we began the review, so shall we end it.  For today's global mantra bearing on democracy as 
prophylaxis and cure for violence, Rapoport and Weinberg's book can be a necessary prophylaxis and 
cure.  This book is timely, provocative, and of great potential value for readers who wish to cut through 
the self-subjugating boilerplate that passes for informed opinion in the current era of globalization. (See 
Bacigalupe, G.  (2000). Family violence in Chile: Political and legal dimensions in a period of democratic 
transition. Violence Against Women, 6, 427-448; Benson, M., & Kugler, J.  (1998). Power parity, 
democracy, and the severity of internal violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 196-209; Caro 
Hollander, N.  (1997). Love in a time of hate: Liberation psychology in Latin America. Rutgers University 
Press; Montiel, C. J., & Wessells, M.  (2001). Democratization, psychology, and the construction of 
cultures of peace.  Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7, 119-129; Prager, J. (1993). Politics 
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and illusion: A psychoanalytic exploration of nationalism. Psychoanalysis & Contemporary Thought, 16, 
561-595; Rapoport, D.C., & Weinberg, L.  (Eds.).  (2001). The democratic experience and political 
violence.  Frank Cass.) (Keywords: Democracy, Rapoport, Violence, Weinberg.) 
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